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Inside the Sudan–UAE Fallout: Proxy Politics and a Fractured Region
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The conflict traces back to the power vacuum after Omar al-Bashir’s fall. The RSF, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), had grown from the Janjaweed militias of the early 2000s into a paramilitary empire with its own gold mines, foreign ties and military infrastructure. Tensions between Hemedti and SAF chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan had simmered for years — especially over integrating the RSF into the national army. When negotiations collapsed in April 2023, Sudan plunged into a war that ripped through Khartoum, tore apart Darfur and Kordofan, and shattered the fragile political transition.
The new phase of escalation emerged when gruesome reports from West Darfur exposed mass killings, sexual violence and targeted assaults against the non-Arab Massalit community. Entire neighbourhoods were emptied, civilians shot at point-blank range, villages torched, and women assaulted in patterns that echoed the worst crimes of the Janjaweed era. These atrocities coincided with RSF gains — and investigators soon found foreign-made guided bombs, drone parts and artillery systems in RSF-controlled areas.
That evidence formed the basis of Sudan’s explosive move in April 2025: filing a case at the International Court of Justice accusing the UAE of “complicity in genocide.” Khartoum alleges that the RSF’s killing power was made possible by a sophisticated pipeline of weapons, drones, fuel, money and mercenaries supplied through UAE-linked networks operating via Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. Independent investigations by UN experts, Amnesty International and conflict-monitoring organisations have reported Chinese-origin GB50A guided bombs, advanced 155mm howitzers, drone technologies and armoured vehicles either sourced from or re-exported by the UAE — all in violation of existing embargoes.
Abu Dhabi strongly denies every allegation. The UAE calls the case “political theatre” and insists it has provided only humanitarian aid — field hospitals, medical teams, evacuation flights and relief supplies. It argues Sudan is attempting to shift blame away from its own governance failures and battlefield losses. For now, the world is split: Sudan points to weapons recovered from RSF sites, flight records and gold-trade networks; the UAE argues the claims are fabricated. The ICJ will decide whether it has jurisdiction, a key hurdle given the UAE’s reservation to parts of the Genocide Convention.
But the courtroom fight is only one layer of a wider geopolitical struggle. Sudan’s war has become the latest theatre in a region already fractured by proxy rivalries. Egypt and Saudi Arabia quietly lean toward the SAF, seeing the RSF as a destabilising force aligned with their rivals. The UAE, accused of backing the RSF, finds itself in a storm of scrutiny. Libya’s Khalifa Haftar — long backed by Abu Dhabi — has been linked to arms transfers and logistical corridors feeding RSF operations. Russian networks, including remnants of the Wagner Group and the newer Africa Corps, appear along the same routes, tied to gold smuggling and weapons transport. Iran and Turkey, meanwhile, are expanding their influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea, adding another layer of competition around Sudan.
This tangled web of foreign involvement has intensified what is now the world’s largest displacement crisis. More than 12 million Sudanese have been forced from their homes; Darfur has witnessed the most severe mass killings since the early 2000s; and famine is looming as aid routes remain blocked by fighting. UN experts describe the violence as “ethnically targeted” and “systematic.” The United States has accused the RSF of genocide. Humanitarian agencies warn that without immediate access, tens of thousands could starve.
The conflict is also destabilizing the Red Sea and global trade. Houthi attacks on commercial shipping, combined with Sudan’s collapse, have pushed major shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. Suez Canal traffic — a cornerstone of Egypt’s economy — has dropped by more than half, costing Cairo billions. This comes just as regional gold and arms-smuggling networks are expanding. RSF-controlled gold mines in Darfur now feed transnational smuggling circuits, with much of the gold believed to be reaching markets in the Gulf, particularly Dubai. For Sudan’s critics, this is not just a war; it is a shadow economy of conflict financing.
International responses remain hesitant and fragmented. The US, EU and African Union have all condemned atrocities but stopped short of confronting Gulf states directly. IGAD’s mediation has stalled, hampered by regional power competition. The UN has warned of “imminent mass death” without immediate humanitarian access. Meanwhile, the ICJ case — if admitted — would mark a rare moment of judicial scrutiny over a state accused of enabling genocide abroad. If dismissed, Sudan is expected to escalate its campaign at the UN Security Council and pursue sanctions targeting RSF-linked and UAE-linked networks.
As the war grinds on, Sudan’s future increasingly depends on what happens beyond its battlefields. Will foreign supply chains — military and financial — be disrupted? Will the ICJ open a case that could redefine norms on state involvement in proxy wars? Will the Red Sea crisis push international actors toward a broader regional settlement? For now, the answers are uncertain. But what is clear is that millions of Sudanese civilians remain trapped in a conflict shaped as much by regional power plays as by local grievances. Whether the world chooses accountability or indifference will determine not only the outcome of Sudan’s war but the security landscape of the entire Red Sea and Horn of Africa region.
Kirti Mathur
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